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Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Toby Walsh
Abstract
One possible escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is computational com-
plexity. For example, it is NP-hard to compute if the STV rule can be manipulated.
However, there is increasing concern that such results may not reflect the difficulty
of manipulation in practice. In this tutorial, I survey recent results in this area.
The Gibbard Satterthwaite theorem proves that, under some simple assumptions, a vot-
ing rule can always be manipulated. A number of possible escapes have been suggested.
For example, if we relax the assumption of an universal domain and replace it with sin-
gle peaked preferences, then strategy free voting rules exist. In an influential paper [1],
Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick proposed that complexity might offer another escape: perhaps
it is computationally so difficult to find a successful manipulation that agents have little
option but to report their true preferences? Many voting rules have subsequently been
shown to be NP-hard to manipulate [3]. However, NP-hardness only dictates the worst-case
and may not reflect the difficulty of manipulation in practice. Indeed, a number of recent
theoretical results suggest that manipulation can often be easy (e.g. [19]).
I argue here that we can study the hardness of manipulation empirically [17, 18]. There
are several reasons why empirical analysis is useful. For example, theoretical analysis is
usually restricted to simple distributions like uniform votes. Votes in real elections may
be very different due, for instance, to correlations between votes. As a second example,
theoretical analysis is often asymptotic so does not reveal the size of hidden constants. Such
constants may be important to the actual computational cost. In addition, elections are
typically bounded in size so asymptotic results may be uninformative. Such experiments
suggest different behaviour occurs in the problem of computing manipulations of voting
rules than in other NP-hard problems like propositional satisfiability [2, 13], constraint
satisfaction [4, 9], number partitioning [6, 8]. and other NP-hard problems [7, 14, 15]. For
instance, many transitions seen in our experiments appear smooth, as seen in polynomial
problems [16].
Another problem in which manipulation may be an issue is the stable marriage prob-
lem. As with voting, an important issue is whether agents can manipulate the result by
mis-reporting their preferences. Unfortunately, Roth [11] proved that all stable marriage
procedures can be manipulated. We might hope that computational complexity might also
be a barrier to manipulate stable marriage procedures. In joint work with Pini, Rossi and
Venable, I have proposed a new stable marriage procedures based on voting that is NP-hard
to manipulate [10].
A third domain in which manipulation may be an issue is sporting tournaments [12].
Manipulating a sporting tournament is slightly different to manipulating an election. In a
sporting tournament, the voters are also the candidates. Since it is hard (without bribery or
similar mechanisms) for a team to play better than it can, we consider just manipulations
where the manipulators can throw games. We show, for example, that we can decide
how to manipulate round robin and cup competitions, two of the most popular sporting
competitions in polynomial time.
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